From Norms, Networks, and Trails by Adrian Cussins
If the ‘rules’ don’t pre-empt what is properly possible in the ‘game’, then the ‘rules’ become part of what is negotiated by the ‘players’. If the ‘rules’ become part of what is negotiated by the ‘players’, then we end up with the comical but also absurd activity of “Calvinball” from the Calvin and Hobbes cartoon strip.
Counter-examples:
1) The US Constitution contains provisions for revising and amending the constitution.
2) Wikipedia encourages active discussion of its policies and guidelines.
Perhaps these processes are comical and absurd, but I don’t think they undermine the normative structure of the game as such. Am I wrong?
I haven’t read that article (I’ll try to get to it tonight), but I’m not sure what exactly you mean by “properly possible” in the game. My best guess is that you mean something like the following “Unless any given rule is seen as restricting possible activities in the game more than the actual mechanics of the game, the rule runs the risk of just being a convention agreed upon by the players, with no real normative weight.” If that’s right (or even close) I think you’re correct in thinking that it’s not a very strong position. I can think of lots of games with “meta-rules,” just like Article Five of the Constitution–that is, lots of games have rules about rules, or rules about how to change rules. Dungeons & Dragons comes immediately to mind; the rules laid down in the Player’s Handbook are explicitly denoted as guidelines for what will likely work to make a good game experience for all players, but there are also ‘rules’ present for modifying, tweaking, or even throwing out rules entire and writing your own. Does that undermine the structure of the game? It doesn’t really seem to me that it does.
You should ask yourself what does Omar say about “the game”?
So this is how your counterexamples work?
The absurdity of Calvinball consists in the entirely uncontrolled nature of its rule-changes. Structured rule-change, requiring the agreement of multiple players (a solid majority in the case of the Constitution), is far less absurd. So the supposed reductio is actually the result of a fallacious slippery-slope argument.